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COUNTERING THE EXCESSIVE
SUBPOENA FOR SCHOLARLY
RESEARCH
MICHAEL TRAYNOR*
I
INTRODUCTION
When researchers rely on others to provide foundational data for research,
they may often need to assure these sources that their identities and identifi-
able data will be kept confidential.  Confidential firsthand reports are essential
tools for enabling researchers to explore a plethora of important questions in
such areas as health, economics, and public policy.  Given their availability to
the public, as well as to legislators and other policy makers, such reports may
advance measures to ameliorate a variety of serious problems.
Unfortunately, even the most objective research may be put at risk if it be-
comes bogged down in the muddy fields of litigation.  A subpoena for confiden-
tial data is likely to be intimidating to a researcher regardless of his level of
confidence in his objective evaluation of the data.  The average researcher is ill-
prepared for the sudden interference of a subpoena or the blocking tactics of an
adversary flanked by expert witnesses.  Yet, subpoenas are an omnipresent
threat in all kinds of cases, from a products liability case against a cigarette
manufacturer to a criminal prosecution of a prostitute.
But what makes a subpoena excessive?  There is no simple definition, nor
bright-line rule; rather, the determination involves weighing various factors: the
public interest served by the research project versus the public or private inter-
est that prompted the subpoena; the importance of guaranteeing confidentiality
in gaining access to essential information and scholarly research versus an al-
leged right to know the identity of the confidential sources or to review the re-
search data.
To date, neither legislatures nor courts have granted researchers an ab-
solute privilege to protect the confidentiality of their research data.  The Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment fails to provide such a
privilege even for newspaper reporters.1  Likewise, statutory and judicial rules
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1. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that reporters are not exempt from the
duty to appear before a grand jury and answer relevant questions); see also In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (James Richard Scarce), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) (citing Bran-
zburg for the position that there is a reporter’s privilege, and denying Scarce’s claim that a scholar’s
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of evidence ordinarily do not provide an explicit privilege for researchers.2
Some rules of evidence even attempt to preclude privileges not expressly pro-
vided by statute.3  In the absence of an express privilege, the most promising
means by which to counter an excessive subpoena may be federal statutes that
provide for confidentiality in certain circumstances,4 privacy provisions in state
constitutions or laws,5 reporters’ shield laws,6 or rules authorizing courts to
quash or modify subpoenas or issue protective orders.7  Although a subpoena
demanding confidential research data does not automatically lead to the
granting of an absolute privilege, a court may exercise its judicial discretion to
undertake a balancing test that may tip the scales for confidentiality.
Although some researchers may be willing or eager to serve as witnesses
themselves or to identify knowledgeable experts to serve in their stead, others
may find the very process of litigation uncongenial or even demeaning, par-
ticularly when it involves undue interruption of work in progress.  Their reluc-
tance to testify may be even greater for litigation in which they are neither par-
ties nor testifying or consulting experts.
This article examines how researchers, research institutions, and their coun-
sel may foresee and effectively counter excessive subpoenas.  The best defense
against an excessive subpoena requires that the researcher be alert to the pos-
sibility of a subpoena from the earliest planning of the research, and that he
remain alert throughout the process.  Taking early precautions and maintaining
awareness allows the researcher to take advantage of existing protections, and
enables him to quickly mobilize his defense should he be served with a sub-
poena.8 This article guides the researcher (and his counsel) through each step of
the process and outlines the legal devices that can be implemented to avoid or
challenge a subpoena.
                                                          
privilege is analogous).
2. See, for example, the absence of such a privilege in CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 900-1063 (West
1996).
3. See, e.g., id. § 911; see also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1989). Cf. Jaffee
v. Redmond, No. 95-266, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3879 (June 13, 1996).
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 241(d), 242m (d), 299a-l(c).
5. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 1; Cal. Civ. Code § 56.10(c)(7); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
333.2631; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.053; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 71-602.
6. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. Art I, § 2; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; see also Delaney v. Superior Court,
789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990) (holding that the shield law does not require showing by a newsperson that
information was obtained in confidence).
7. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also David D. Siegel, Federal Sub-
poena Practice Under The New Rule 45 of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 197, 231-36
(1992).
8. This essay makes no distinction between researchers and research institutions.  It is a fair as-
sumption that confidentiality assurances made by a researcher are authorized by the supervising re-
search institution and that the researcher’s and the research institution’s interests in protection and
nondisclosure are shared and do not conflict in any material way.  If they arrive at a final juncture of
deciding whether to risk contempt for violating a court order, it is possible, but by no means certain,
that the individual researcher and the institution might view the issues differently.  In that event, each
should be counseled separately.
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II
THE PLANNING STAGES
A.  Identify The Reasons For Confidentiality
Researchers should determine at the outset whether they can obtain the
necessary data free from of any guarantee of confidentiality.  If not, they should
document the reasons requiring confidentiality.  In many cases, confidentiality
may be essential to protect data sources from an invasion of privacy, from em-
barrassment or distress, or from criminal prosecution, tax audits, or other gov-
ernment investigations, as well as from litigation by others.
Such confidential information is akin to a trade secret.  Courts and legisla-
tures already protect trade secrets because their value and utility depend on
their not being widely known.9  Likewise, courts should be receptive to requests
to protect essential research information because its value and utility also de-
pends on confidentiality.  The researcher who prepares a written memorandum
at the inception of the research setting forth the reasons for confidentiality will
be well-prepared to persuade a court that the project could not have proceeded
without the assurance of confidentiality.
Case law and commentators offer guidance as to when confidentiality
should be safeguarded.  For example, John Wigmore’s handbook on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence includes the following requirements for confidentiality:
(1)  The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2)  This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory main-
tenance of the relation between the parties.
(3)  The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4)  The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tions must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litiga-
tion.10
Courts will take such factors into account when determining whether informa-
tion should be accorded confidentiality protection.  Researchers would be well-
advised to consider these factors before proceeding with their research.
B.  Give Confidentiality Assurances Sparingly
Researchers should offer assurances of confidentiality only when the assur-
ances are the avenue to forthright and full disclosure of useful data.  If an as-
surance was not necessary or at least justifiable, a court may not be inclined to
protect the data from disclosure.  Moreover, if a court refuses to uphold such
an assurance, researchers and their sponsors may be liable for the ensuing
                                                          
9. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
10. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1997)
(emphasis in original).
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breach of confidentiality.11
Researchers frequently qualify their assurances by adding a proviso that
confidential data will not be disclosed except as required by law.  Such a pro-
viso may alert the source to the possibility of compelled disclosure and may
strengthen the researchers’ defense against a claim of liability premised in con-
tract, promissory estoppel, or tort in the event of such disclosure.  On the other
hand, such a proviso could lead the party subpoenaing the data to contend that
the possibility of compelled production was anticipated and that enforcement
of a subpoena, therefore, is not inconsistent with the qualified assurance
given.12  Nonetheless, because the proviso is so broad, it does not entirely fore-
close the possibility of litigation against a researcher for disclosure.  Addition-
ally, this type of proviso may dissuade some potential research subjects from
participating in research studies.  Therefore, because the protective effect of
the proviso is questionable, researchers should consider excluding it, especially
when federal confidentiality protection is available.
Confidentiality agreements may vary depending on the source and the ex-
tent of the data.  An agreement with a chemical company involved in an envi-
ronmental clean-up or an insurance company involved in mass tort litigation
may provide more rules governing confidential data and subpoenas than a short
form of consent and confidentiality assurance that might be used in a study of
mentally ill homeless persons or elderly medical patients.  Such an agreement
might require notification if a subpoena is served or the use of best efforts by
the researcher to resist production of confidential data; it might limit the
“except as required by law proviso” to a court order, not merely a subpoena;
and it might provide for return or destruction of the data at the conclusion of
the study.
C.  Obtain Federal Confidentiality Protection, If Available
In the area of public health, federal law offers two sources of confidentiality
protection.  First, federal statutes limit the disclosure and use of information
obtained in the course of research supported or conducted by the Public Health
Service, which includes the National Institutes of Health and the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research.13  For example, one provision protects infor-
mation obtained through activities carried out or supported by the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research:
                                                          
11. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that the First Amendment does
not bar a promissory estoppel action for breach of assurance of confidentiality); G. Michael Harvey,
Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385 (1992)
(arguing for the creation of an action in tort for disclosure of private facts against the source of disclo-
sure).
12. See, e.g., Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. U.S., 85 Cust. Ct. 128 (1980) (compelling disclosure of a non-
party’s answer to an International Trade Commission questionnaire, noting that persons who re-
sponded were informed that the information would not be disclosed “except as required by law”); see
also Bert Black, Subpoenas and Science—When Lawyers Force Their Way into the Laboratory, 336 N.
ENG. J. MED. 725-27 (1997).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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[N]o information, if an establishment or person supplying the information or de-
scribed in it is identifiable, obtained in the course of activities undertaken or sup-
ported under this subchapter [VII] may be used for any purpose other than the pur-
pose for which it was supplied unless such establishment or person has consented (as
determined under regulations of the Secretary) to its use for such other purpose.
Such information may not be published or released in other form if the person who
supplied the information or who is described in it is identifiable unless such person
has consented (as determined under the regulations of the Secretary) to its publica-
tion or release in other form.14
This provision, which is interpreted as giving researchers no discretion re-
garding disclosure of the protected data, regardless of who seeks it,15 automati-
cally grants confidentiality protection to all projects that fall within its scope.
Second, some public officials have the authority to grant confidentiality pro-
tection under certain circumstances.16  For instance, one such provision gives
the Secretary of Health discretion to grant federal confidentiality certificates
for a range of both publicly and privately funded research projects:
[T]he Secretary may authorize persons engaged in biomedical, behavioral, clinical or
other research (including research on mental health, including the use and effect of
alcohol and other psychoactive drugs) to protect the privacy of individuals who are
the subject of such research by withholding from all persons not concerned with the
conduct of such research the names and other identifying characteristics of such indi-
viduals.  Persons so authorized to protect the privacy of such individuals may not be
compelled in any [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative or
other proceedings to identify such individuals.17
To obtain a federal confidentiality certificate, a researcher must submit an
application including details about the individuals having major responsibilities
in the project, the research protocol, and various assurances.18  Upon receipt,
the Secretary can issue a certificate, deny it and state the reasons therefor, or
request additional information from the applicant.19  Once armed with a confi-
dentiality certificate under federal law, a researcher in federal or state court, or
in other proceedings, has the discretion to refuse to divulge the identity or iden-
tifying details of the individual source(s) who furnished the data upon assur-
ance of confidentiality.  The substance of the information disclosed, however, is
not confidential—only the identity of the source is—and it may be aggregated
with comparable data in a public report.
                                                          
14. See id. § 299a-1(c).
15. See Memorandum from Susan Greene Merewitz, Senior Attorney in the Office of General
Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services, to John P. Fanning, Senior Health Policy
Advisor, Jan. 30, 1995 (on file with author) [hereinafter Merewitz memo].
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (1994) (giving Secretary of Health discretion to grant federal confiden-
tiality certificates for biomedical, behavioral, clinical, and other research); 21 U.S.C. § 872 (c) (giving
Attorney General discretion to authorize grants of confidentiality for educational and research pro-
grams directly related to the enforcement of laws under the Attorney General’s jurisdiction).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (1994); see Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 451, 505-06 (1995).
18. See 42 C.F.R. § 2a.  Researchers should be aware that persons entering the project after the
expiration date of the confidentiality certificate are not protected from disclosure.  However, re-
searchers may submit a written request for an extension of the expiration date.  Upon approval, the
Secretary of Health will issue an amended confidentiality certificate.  Id. § 2a.6(c).
19. See id. § 2a.6(b).
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These two statutory provisions overlap to some extent.  Although logically
one might assume that confidentiality protection is enhanced when these provi-
sions are used in combination, this is not necessarily the case.  According to
federal authorities, a confidentiality certificate will weaken the protection that
qualifying projects receive under the self-executing statutory grant of confiden-
tiality.20  There are two explanations for this result: First, federal confidentiality
certificates give the researcher discretion to disclose the protected data.  In
contrast, under a statutory grant of confidentiality, the researcher may disclose
the protected data only if the research subject consents after notice.  Second,
a federal confidentiality certificate protects only the names or other identifying
characteristics of the research subjects.  In contrast, a statutory grant of confi-
dentiality protects all data obtained in the course of activities falling under the
scope of the statute.21  It is important for researchers to have knowledge of
these differences so they may determine what information is protected and
when they may legally disclose protected information.
These public health statutes illustrate the variety of federal confidentiality
protection that may be available to resourceful researchers.  Thus, researchers
are well-advised to investigate possible sources of statutory protection before
resorting only to home-spun confidentiality assurances.
III
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
A.  Unlink the Names and Identifying Details of Sources from Confidential
Data and Safeguard the Data
It is an elementary precaution immediately to unlink the names and other
identifying details of the study participants.  The researcher should safeguard
the identifying names and details and their linkage to the other data by keeping
them in restricted areas or locked files and, in some cases, by destroying them.22
This data should be safeguarded until they are aggregated for publication in a
report wherein no ordinary reader could identify any study participant.23
In sum a research institution and researcher should adhere to
a confidentiality plan from beginning to end.  Then courts, which already pro-
                                                          
20. See Merewitz memo, supra note 15, at 2.
21. See id. at 2-3.
22. See Paul Nejelski & Lindsey M. Lerman, A Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege: What to
Do Before the Subpoena Arrives, 1971 WIS. L. REV. 1085, 1096-98.  Such aggregated reporting raises
the important and separate question of whether and how studies based on confidential data can be
verified or tested reliably without compromising confidentiality.
23. It is possible in some circumstances that an insider who is highly knowledgeable and astute, for
example an industrial participant in a confidential study of an industry, might infer that certain data
reported in the aggregate possibly relates to a particular participant.  Holding researchers and research
institutions to the exacting standard that it must be impossible for even the most informed and astute
reader to extract individual data would be counterproductive because it would lead to dilution of re-
ported data that could render tables and conclusions so general that they would be meaningless.  I am
not aware of any case on the point.
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tect trade secrets when their possessors have taken reasonable steps to main-
tain their secrecy,24 should prove amenable to protecting confidential research
that has been carefully safeguarded via restricting access to only those persons
directly engaged in research of the data.
B.  Comply with the Requirements of Your Institutional Review Board
Research projects that use confidential data from individuals are ordinarily
screened by the research institution’s institutional review board (“IRB”), some-
times called the human subjects protection committee.25  Such a review ordi-
narily ensures compliance with requisite forms and procedures for obtaining
the informed consent of study participants and protecting their privacy.  Should
litigation nonetheless ensue, the researcher could then demonstrate compliance
with the requirements of its IRB.  Compliance will show the unity of interests
in confidentiality of the researcher, the research institution, and the research
subject and counter a contention that the confidentiality  assurance was not
authorized.
IV
AFTER THE SUBPOENA ARRIVES
A.  Consult with Your Management and Counsel Immediately
Researchers unfamiliar with court procedures and subpoenas may be jolted
when served with a subpoena.  They may fear intrusion upon their work, the vi-
tiation of the assurances of confidentiality they extended, or a public array of
their records and computer databases in a courtroom.  Subpoenas are often
phrased in extraordinarily broad and demanding terms that might further alarm
researchers who are unaware that sweeping subpoenas are common and mean
“just about as much as the asking price for a rug in an Oriental bazaar.”26  Such
broad subpoenas are inconsistent with Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  The court accordingly has discretion to quash the overbroad sub-
poena and require the requesting party to start anew instead of modifying the
subpoena.27
                                                          
24. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 289(a); 45 CFR §§ 46.101-.409.  Various federal agencies have recently
adopted a common Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects. 56 Fed. Reg. 28003 (June 18,
1991).
26. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1984).  Compare id. with
Kennedy v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety, 115 F.R.D. 497, 500-01 (D. Conn. 1987)
(allowing deposition of researcher but also redaction of names of confidential sources).
27. See Tiberi v. Cigna Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994); Audiotext Communications Net-
work, Inc. v. UC Telecom, Inc., No. 94-2395-GTV, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15416, at *18-19 (D. Kan.
Oct. 5, 1995) (“Use of too all-encompassing language … violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 45”); Insituform
Technologies, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 630 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting earlier order
quashing invasive subpoena, and quashing new subpoena, that met specificity requirement but other-
wise violated Rule 45).  For a strong recent state court case mandating the trial court to vacate orders
“compelling a nonparty to produce materials in response to a subpoena describing generalized broad
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Researchers might rashly contemplate either destroying, or concealing the
data demanded or, conversely, divulging it in detail.  However, the belief or
hope that such behavior could stave off an appearance in court or at a deposi-
tion is unrealistic.  Fear, destruction, concealment or the divulgence of confi-
dential data is not merely inappropriate, but also self-defeating.  Evasive tactics
may provoke the court to rule adversely and divulsion may remove the basis for
protection.  Instead, the researcher should report the subpoena promptly to the
appropriate officer (or other designated person) within the research institution;
the officer will usually then contact legal counsel.
B.  Make Timely Service of Written Objections
A researcher’s first line of defense after receiving a subpoena is to make
written objections to the inspection or copying of any or all of the researcher’s
records and data.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 requires that the proce-
dure for making an objection be set forth in the subpoena.28 Specifically, the
objections must be served upon the party designated in the subpoena within
fourteen days after service of the subpoena, or before the time specified for
compliance if such time is less than fourteen days after service.29  Additionally,
if records and data are being withheld because they are privileged, the claim of
privilege must be made expressly and must be supported by a description of the
withheld material sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the
claim.30
Once the researcher has objected, the party serving the subpoena may nei-
ther inspect nor copy the researcher’s records and data unless the court that is-
sued the subpoena orders production of the documents.31 Once the researcher
makes an objection, the party serving the subpoena can move for an order to
compel production.32  Even if the court issues the order to compel production, it
has a duty to protect a nonparty researcher from “significant expense” resulting
from compliance with the subpoena.33  Thus, a timely objection serves two pur-
poses: it protects the researcher’s data from disclosure for a period, and it lays
the foundation for a claim for compensation to the researcher in the event that
the court orders compliance with the subpoena.
C.  Negotiate an Acceptable Limitation of the Subpoena or Move to Quash or
Modify It
Lawyers should consider the possibility of negotiating with the party sub-
                                                          
categories of materials rather than specific documents or, at least categories … reasonably particular-
ized,” see CalCor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567, 569 (Cal. App. 1997).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D).
29. See id. 45(c)(2)(B).
30. See id. 45(d)(2).
31. See id
32. See id.
33. Id. 45(c)(2)(B).
TRAYNOR.FMT 08/13/97  2:37 PM
Page 119:  Summer 1996] EXCESSIVE SUBPOENAS 127
poenaing the data.  Negotiations can often result in substantial limitations on
the subpoena—disclosure of data may be limited by scope, type, or time, and,
moreover, to nonconfidential data.  Negotiations may also serve to facilitate
convenient arrangements for the appearance of the witness or in some cases for
no appearance.  Negotiation can be an effective, inexpensive, and muted way to
counter intrusive subpoenas.  Even if unsuccessful, reasonable attempts to ne-
gotiate may improve the researcher’s stance before the court.  This approach is
reinforced by the 1991 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45,
which enlarges the protections afforded to those persons required to assist the
court.34  Rule 45 gives the court discretion to quash or modify a subpoena in or-
der to protect unretained experts.35 Undoubtedly, a court will be more sympa-
thetic toward a researcher who makes a reasonable attempt to resolve the dis-
covery conflict without court intervention.
Further, a researcher’s attempts to negotiate will be considered by the court
when assessing whether to impose sanctions under Rule 45.36  Under Rule 45,
an attorney issuing a subpoena has a duty to avoid imposing undue burden or
expense on the person subpoenaed.37 Breach of this duty is punishable by sanc-
tions, which may include lost earnings and reasonable attorney fees.38
Most importantly, negotiating in good faith is a prerequisite for obtaining a
protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.39  The moving party
must certify both that a good faith attempt was made to resolve the discovery
conflict without court intervention, and that there is good cause for a protective
order.40  Even if the moving party cannot persuade opposing parties to discuss
the conflict, he must note any efforts to arrange such a discussion on the certifi-
cate.41  A court’s protective order can either condition or preclude discovery,
depending on what means are necessary to protect the researcher and subjects
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.42
If negotiations fail to limit the subpoena, the opposing party has the option
of moving to quash or modify the subpoena.43  Researchers and their counsel
should not hesitate to file such a motion if the subpoenaing party remains ob-
durate against all efforts to negotiate.  They may be able to persuade a court
                                                          
34. Id. 45 advisory committee’s note.
35. Id. 45(c)(3)(B).
36. See High Tech Med. Instrument., Inc. v. New Image Industries, Inc., No. C-93-4152
SBA(PJH)-ENE, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16504, at *3, *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1995) (counsel breached
duty under Rule 45 by failing to take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden on a non-
party).
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).
38. See id.
39. Id. 26(c).
40. See id.
41. See id. advisory committee’s note, subdivision (c).
42. See id. 26(c).
43. See, e.g., id. at 45(c); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1987.1; see also Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States, Comm. on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 102 Cong., 1st. Sess., H. Doc. 102-77, at 11-20, 132-50 (May 1,
1991).
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that the subpoena is unreasonably broad and that a limited response, not in-
volving production of confidential data, would be sufficient.
Given the court’s discretion to quash or modify a subpoena,44 the researcher
should provide the court with reasons to exercise that discretion in his favor.
For example, in Richards of Rockford, Inc.  v. Pacific Gas & Electric,45 the court
addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining discovery
outweighed the public’s interest in promoting confidential research.  The plain-
tiff in Rockford deposed a professor who had investigated Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric (“PG&E”) employees as part of his research into organizational structure
and decision-making.  At his deposition, the professor refused to disclose
names of the PG&E employees.46
The court found for the professor, but on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, explicitly stating that “[t]he result … [was] not based upon any
privilege; rather it [was] founded upon the court’s supervisory powers over dis-
covery.”47  Despite its failure to recognize a researcher’s privilege, the court af-
firmed the importance of maintaining confidentiality.  It recognized that
“[c]ompelled disclosure of confidential information would without question se-
verely stifle research into questions of public policy, the very subjects in which
the public interest is the greatest.”48
Federal courts may also protect confidential research consistent with Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501.49  Even though Rule 501 does not expressly provide
for a researcher’s privilege, it leaves room for a case-by-case recognition of
privileges.  For example, in Trammel v. United States,50 the United States Su-
preme Court considered whether to modify the marital privilege as it existed at
common law.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained the intended
scope of Rule 501: “In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501,
Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege.
Its purpose rather was to provide courts with the flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis.”51  This rationale is reinforced by Judge Wein-
stein who, in his treatise on evidence, reads Rule 501’s “reason and experience”
requirement as calling for a balancing of interests.52
                                                          
44. See supra note 27.
45. 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
46. See id. at 389.
47. Id. at 389 n.2;  see United States v. Doe, 406 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972); Richard L. Marcus, Dis-
covery Along The Litigation/Science Interface, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 381, 400-11 (1991) (considering the
possibility of a researcher’s privilege, and concluding that one should not be created).
48. Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 390; see Robert M. O’Neil, Scientific Research and the First Amendment:
An Academic Privilege, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 837, 848-49 (1983).
49. FED. R. EVID. 501 (noting that privileges in certain actions “shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law … in the light of reason and experience”); see John H. Derrick, Annotation,
“Scholar’s Privilege” under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 81 A.L.R. FED. 904 (1993).
50. 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (holding that the marital privilege vests only in witness spouses who may
neither be compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying, thereby modifying earlier rule that the
testimony of one spouse against the other was barred unless both consent).
51. Id. at 47 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
52. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§
501.02[3]b][iii], 501.10[4] (2d ed. 1997).
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The Court furthered the recognition of a researcher’s privilege under Rule
501 in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 4, 1984.53  In that case, a Ph.D.
candidate underwent questioning during a police investigation of a fire at “Le
Restaurant.”54  The graduate student had been observing workers at Le Restau-
rant for his dissertation, “The Sociology of the American Restaurant.”55  He re-
fused to disclose any of his notes, stating only that he had promised “many” of
his sources confidentiality and that the research was necessary for his thesis.56
The court reversed an order quashing the subpoena and remanded the case
so that the researcher could make
a threshold showing consisting of a detailed description of the nature and seriousness
of the scholarly study in question, of the methodology employed, of the need for as-
surances of confidentiality to various sources to conduct the study, and of the fact that
the disclosure requested by the subpoena will seriously impinge upon that confidenti-
ality.57
Although the court acknowledged that there was leeway in Rule 501 for a
researcher’s privilege, it emphasized that the privilege was not absolute.58
Moreover, the court required the researcher to “make a good faith designation
of those portions of his work arguably covered by the scholar’s privilege and
permit in camera inspection and redaction by the court.”59
As Professors Wright and Miller have stated, “[a] growing problem bas
been the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence and information by
unretained experts.”60  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3) addresses this
issue:
(A)  On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was issued shall quash or
modify the subpoena if it .  .  .
(iii)  requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or
waiver applies, or
(iv)  subjects a person to undue burden.
(B)  If a subpoena
(i)  requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information, or
(ii)  requires disclosure of an unretained expert’s opinion or information not describ-
ing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert’s study
made not at the request of any party, .  .  .
The court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or
modify the subpoena, or if the party in whose behalf the subpoena is issued shows a
substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without
                                                          
53. 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 224.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id. at 225.
58. See id
59. Id. at 226.
60. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2463, at 76 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1997).
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undue hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is addressed will
be reasonably compensated, the court may order appearance or production only upon
specified conditions.61
In applying the foregoing amendments, the incompleteness of a research
project may also bear on a court’s decision to quash or modify a subpoena.  For
example, the court in Application of American Tobacco Co.,62 while accepting
the concept of a researcher’s privilege, confined the privilege to unpublished
works.  The court recognized that a researcher whose work was still in progress
should be protected against the loss of time, opportunity, and/or academic
freedom that might ensue from a premature breach of confidentiality.63
Moreover, the court deemed it important that premature disclosure in this case
would have denied the doctors the opportunity of first publication of their
studies.64
In contrast, the court had reservations about protecting published findings.
It reasoned that published research must undergo public scrutiny to ensure its
credibility and hence should not heedlessly be protected from such scrutiny.65
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen,66 the court discussed various factors to be
weighed with respect to subpoenas involving published findings.  Dow involved
a request for research data regarding the toxic effects of an herbicide, TCDD.
At the time of the request, the researcher had not completed his project.67 The
Dow court acknowledged that the researcher’s “interest in academic freedom
may properly figure into the legal calculation of whether forced disclosure
would be reasonable.”68  The Court premised its conclusion on the long history
of support for academic freedom evidenced by Supreme Court precedents—
precedents that create a formidable barrier to intrusion on research.69  The
court also reaffirmed earlier holdings that had factored a researcher’s third-
party status into the weighing process, noting that a researcher’s distance from
the litigation tends to make compliance with a subpoena more burdensome.70
Finally, the court spelled out various harmful effects that could ensue from
premature disclosure:
that public access to the research data would make the studies an unacceptable basis
for scientific papers or other research; that peer review and publication of the study
was crucial to the researchers’ credibility and careers and would be precluded by
whole or partial public disclosure of the information; that loss of the opportunity to
publish would severely decrease the researchers’ professional opportunities in the fu-
ture; and that even inadvertent disclosure of the information would risk total destruc-
                                                          
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3); see David D. Siegel, Federal Subpoena Practice under the New Rule
45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 197 (1992).
62. 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1987).  A state court in New York had earlier quashed a similar sub-
poena.  In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
63. See America Tobacco, 880 F.2d at 1524, 1528.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 1529-30.
66. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 1266.
68. Id. at 1276-77.
69. See id. at 1275.
70. See id. at 1277.
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tion of months or years of research.71
Robert O’Neil, noting “that the researcher enjoys at least minimal constitu-
tional protection,” has offered “some practical desiderata” for such cases, in-
cluding “the potential utility of alternative sources of information;” the neces-
sity for “proof of the probative value of the information;” “the relationship of
the researcher to the litigation;” whether the proceeding is a routine civil suit or
one of “those rare criminal cases in which information held only by a third
party might be critical to a suspect’s defense;” “the effects of disclosure upon
persons other than the subpoena respondent;” “the status of the research,” for
example, whether the demand is “for data supporting a finished publication” or
“for raw material in progress;” “the effects of research findings or results upon
eventual publication;” the “principal investigator’s reasonable expectations;”
and “the contribution of each decision to transcendent principles of free inquiry
and the advancement of knowledge.”72
D.  Seek an Adequate Protective Order
If a researcher is unable to limit a subpoena to nonconfidential data
through negotiations or court order, a court may nonetheless be receptive to a
researcher’s claim that at the very least he should be granted a protective order
for his research.73 Some of the benefits of a protective order are as follows: It
can protect data from access by anyone other than the attorneys, experts, and
others working directly on the case; it can limit the use of the data to the court
proceeding alone; it can provide for confidentiality monitoring during the use
of the data; it can assure the return of the data when the proceedings are fin-
ished; and it can require all persons utilizing the data to give assurances of con-
fidentiality and provide for a contempt of court charge in the event of breach.
There is ample precedent for a protective order to protect confidential data.
For example, in Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,74 the plaintiffs brought a
products liability action against a tampon manufacturer claiming that they had
been injured by Toxic Shock Syndrome (“TSS”).  In connection with the action,
Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”) served a discovery request on the Center for Dis-
ease Control (“CDC”), a nonparty.75  P&G sought the names and addresses of
women who had participated in the CDC’s TSS studies.76 The CDC researchers
gathered sensitive information from female participants, but the CDC did not
                                                          
71. Id. at 1273; see also O’Neil, supra note 48, at 839-40, 850-51.
72. O’Neil, supra note 48, at 853-55.
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 45(c)(3).  See also Jacqueline S. Guenego, Trends in Protective Or-
ders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c): Why Some Cases Fumble While Others Score, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (1991); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 457; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1991) (arguing against the need for reforms geared towards greater public
access to discovery); see also Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Courts: Discour-
aging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643 (1991) (defending Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 76a which establishes a presumption of openness in most civil court records).
74. 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
75. See id. at 1546
76. See id.
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give its research subjects any confidentiality assurances.77  The CDC produced
all of its TSS-related research documents but refused to disclose the identities
of its study participants.78  P&G sought to compel disclosure, alleging that the
information was necessary to discover biases in the studies’ methodology.79  The
CDC refused to comply with the request on the ground that source disclosure
would inhibit its ability to conduct future studies.80
The circuit court held that the lower court’s protective order was permissi-
ble under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).81  It explicitly stated that the
confidentiality of sources could be maintained even absent a recognized re-
searcher’s privilege, finding that “Rule 26(c) gives the district court discretion-
ary power to fashion a protective order.  The decision does not depend upon a
legal privilege.”82
In addition, the court deemphasized the need for express assurances of con-
fidentiality, finding that confidentiality can be protected even absent an agree-
ment.  “Even without an express guarantee of confidentiality there is still an
expectation, not unjustified, that when highly personal and potentially embar-
rassing information is given for the sake of medical research, it will remain pri-
vate.”83
In determining whether to grant an order protecting confidential sources,
courts will weigh the competing interests.  A protective order, by deterring
lengthy proceedings, lessens the risks to researchers.  They may be spared the
lost time and opportunity costs that result from protracted hearings,84 the com-
pulsory disclosure of information that might jeopardize future research by
“reducing, rather than increasing, the production of information useful to the
resolution of lawsuits,”85 and the concomitant risk of losing the cooperation of
research subjects and even scientific colleagues.86
The court may face challenging issue of balancing when the research report
                                                          
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1547.
82. Id. at 1548. For additional cases discussing the discretion of the court under Rule 26(c), see
Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983); Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811
(2d Cir. 1976); In re The Exxon Valdez Re: All cases, Misc. No. 92-0072-RV-C (S.D. Ala.) (protective
order filed June 12, 1993); Anderson, Greenwood & Co. v. Nibsco Supply, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9413 (W.D.N.Y June 26, 1996).  In some cases, a protective order may preclude discovery of docu-
ments or testimony from a nonparty  researcher.  See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Fischer, 427
S.E.2d 810 (Ga. App. 1993).
83. Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547.
84. See Virginia G. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 102-03 (1985).
85. Id. at 113.
86. See David A. Kaplan & Brian M. Cogan, The Case Against Recognition of a General Academic
Privilege, 60 J. URBAN L. 205, 224-25 (1983).  For an important recent case discussing the relationship
between the availability of a protective order under Rule 26(c) and the exemptions under the Freedom
of Information Act for records not available by law to a party in litigation with a federal agency, see
Burke v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 87 F.3d 508 (D.C. Cir 1996)
(Wald, J.).
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not only is published but also may have contributed to one party’s bringing an
action against another.  For example, in U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry As-
sociation of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc.,87 the government brought a civil RICO action
against several defendants claiming that the defendants were part of a criminal
organization that controlled the garbage industry in parts of New York.  De-
fendants served a deposition subpoena on Peter Reuter, a nonparty economist
who had authored a RAND study eight years prior to the litigation entitled
Racketeering in Legitimate Industries: A Study in the Economics of Intimidation.
Reuter’s report may have contributed to the government’s decision to pursue a
RICO action against defendants, and the government considered using the re-
port as substantive evidence in the case.  Defendants claimed that their sole
motivation for deposing Reuter was to counter the government’s use of
Reuter’s report.
As counsel for Reuter, I moved for a protective order.88  The district court
granted the motion for a protective order conditioned upon the government’s
assurance that it would not use the Reuter report offensively.89  If the govern-
ment later decided to use the report, the court required it to give defendants
sixty days advance notice.90  At that point, Reuter would be obligated to re-
spond to the defendants’ written interrogatories.  If interrogatories did not
yield satisfactory responses, then the court could order a limited deposition.  To
date, Reuter has not been required to submit to any discovery.
The district court in Private Sanitation noted several competing factors in its
analysis:
I’m fully aware .  .  .  that if scholars could not conduct research, which would essen-
tially involve the receipt of information that is closely guarded, many public purposes
would be disserved.  .  .  .  I understand that public policy.  I also understand that a de-
fendant who the government is seeking to deprive of a good portion of his wealth also
has certain rights that have to be balanced against that scholar’s rights.  And I would
say that the best formula would be one that accommodates both, if such a formula is
available.91
Dr.  Reuter is not a party to this litigation.  In balancing equities, one of the factors
that are [sic] thrown into the scales is the fact that a person who is not involved in a
dispute cannot be compelled, expert or not, to expend time and treasure to serve as a
minimally-paid witness, expert or otherwise.92
                                                          
87. No. CV 89-1848 ILG (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 1994).
88. The case was pending in the Eastern District of New York and the subpoena was issued by the
District of Maryland.  On behalf of Reuter, we elected to proceed in the court where the case was
pending, the court was knowledgeable about the issues, and the pertinent U.S. Attorney’s office was
located, rather than in the court that issued the subpoena.  See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(c), 45(c)(3).
The responding party’s election may vary with the circumstances, and it may affect the ability to ap-
peal. See 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 60, § 2466, at 88-89.
89. The court declined to find that Reuter was protected from discovery under the reporter’s
privilege: “I can’t see that Dr. Reuter … [has] a privilege—I’m talking about the balancing of equity
and Rule 501… .  [T]here is no reporter privilege engraved into federal privilege … . [I]t’s not a privi-
lege that I am compelled to absolutely respect.”  Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable A. Si-
mon Chrein, U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge at 24-25:9-1.
90. See id. at 40:16-23.
91. Id. at 13-14:21-7.
92. Id. at 19-20:21-1.
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There is a distinction between the deference I have to show a criminal defendant and
the deference to be shown a civil defendant.  Liberty is still a higher value in the value
scales than the mere loss of money.93
The court’s approach reflects the complicated weighing process that accompa-
nies the issuance of a protective order.
In weighing the pros and cons of a protective order, courts may also con-
sider the status of the subpoenaed party.  It might be a private research institu-
tion that is privately funded, a private research institution that is publicly
funded, or a federally mandated research institution.  Courts may be disinclined
to intercede on behalf of the last category.94 There is some support for the
proposition, however, that a private institution’s receipt of federal funds does
not reduce its confidentiality protections.95
Once a court issues a protective order ensuring confidentiality, it may im-
pose sanctions against any party that attempts to violate confidentiality.96
Whatever balance of competing interests a protective order may represent,
it still may not settle all matters.  It still involves a divulgence of confidential
data to persons who were not intended recipients for purposes that were not in-
tended.  Moreover, it transfers some control over the data from the researcher
to the court, with the attendant risk that a busy court will not have time for the
requisite diligence to protect data adequately.  There also remains the lingering
possibility that if the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing or call for and
review thorough affidavits at the outset, it may not be sufficiently informed of
the interests of the litigants or of the public, to balance them adequately.97
E.  Notify Confidential Sources and Study  Participants when There is Risk of
Disclosure
Researchers should promptly notify confidential sources whenever their
data is subpoenaed.  Giving timely notice to them may help the researcher and
facilitate a solution.  The sources may waive confidentiality, thereby eliminat-
ing the problem.  They may support the researcher in pursuing remedies that
would limit the scope of the subpoena.  Notice also amplifies the court’s aware-
ness of the researcher’s concern for the privacy of confidential sources.  The
                                                          
93. Id. at 21-22:24-2.
94. See Joe S. Cecil & Eugene Griffin, The Role of Legal Policies in Data Sharing, in SHARING
RESEARCH DATA 148, 150 (Fienberg et al. eds., 1985).
95. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980) (researcher’s data was not accessible under Free-
dom of Information Act merely because researcher received federal funds).  Cf. Board of Trustees of
The Leland Stanford Junior University v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991) (in ordering that a
government contract be awarded to Stanford without including a provision requiring the approval of a
contracting officer or other government official prior to publication or discussion of preliminary re-
search results, the court held that Stanford could “use its own judgment on when and where to publish,
notwithstanding that its research is supported with federal funds”).
96. Application of American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1530 (2d Cir. 1989).
97. Cf. Marcus, supra note 73, at 481 (noting that “the ability of courts to discern whether discov-
ery materials bear on public safety must be doubted”); Howard Schlossberg, Researcher in Exxon Case
Develops System to Thwart Demands for Data, MARKETING NEWS, Sept. 16, 1991, at 7 (quoting John
Petterson, who criticized a ruling that compelled him to produce confidential data pursuant to a pro-
tective order: “Exxon is important,” he said, “We are nothing to the case.”).
TRAYNOR.FMT 08/13/97  2:37 PM
Page 119:  Summer 1996] EXCESSIVE SUBPOENAS 135
very anonymity of the participants may also give the court impetus to seal the
proceedings.98  Given the benefits that can result from giving such notification,
it is not surprising that some states explicitly require notice in comparable cir-
cumstances.99
V
WHEN DISCLOSURE HAS BEEN ORDERED
A.  Seek Recovery for the Costs of Compliance with a Subpoena when Possible
and Appropriate
Courts may take steps to ease the financial burden on a nonparty researcher
incurred from compliance with a subpoena, even when such an accommodation
might not be provided to a party.100  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 con-
tains two provisions that allow nonparty researchers to recover the costs of
compliance.101  First, researchers will be “reasonably compensated” where a
subpoena requires disclosure of information and opinions obtained through a
study that was not conducted at the request of any party.102  Second, if the court
issues an order to compel production, the court has a duty to protect a nonparty
researcher from “significant expenses” connected with the production of
documents.103  Some courts merge these two provisions, even though they pro-
vide distinct and separate grounds for recovery.104
B.  Develop the Constitutional Issues and Policy Questions and Preserve
Significant Matters for Appellate Review
Though developing, the law in this area is largely unsettled.  Whenever ap-
propriate, counsel for the researcher should alert the trial court to the sensitiv-
ity, importance, and unresolved state of the issues.  In addition to the custom-
ary affidavits, counsel might even seek an evidentiary hearing in order to
develop a full record in the event of appellate review.
The following section outlines the premises for the principal constitutional
                                                          
98. See Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted
to Keep Their Identities Confidential, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985).
99. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior
Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975). CAL CODE CIV. PROC. § 1985.3 (subpoenas for personal records of
insurance); Annot., Tracy A. Bateman, Search and Seizure of Bank Records Pertaining to Customer as
Violation of Customer’s Rights Under State Law, 33 A.L.R. 5th 453 (1995).
100. See Wertheim Schroder & Co., Inc. v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2287(PKL), 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1995).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
102. Id. at 45(c)(3)(B).
103. Id. at 45(c)(2)(B).
104. See Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. Supp. 232, 264-65 (D. Del. 1992)
(awarding nonparty “reasonable production costs” under its duty to protect a nonparty from
“significant expense”); Wertheim Schroder, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19 (citing Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(iii)
for the proposition that a nonparty should be compensated where the nonparty would otherwise incur
“substantial expense”).
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and policy claims that might be advanced in the trial court and preserved for
appeal.105  Depending on the situation, the lawyer may wish to advance them
separately or invoke them in tandem to augment the rationale for quashing or
modifying a subpoena or issuing a protective order.
1.  Academic Freedom and the Attendant Freedom of Scientific Inquiry.  The
Continental Congress, in a letter to the inhabitants of Quebec, extolled the
virtues of free expression including “the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and the arts in general .  .  .  .”106  Science also has a significant place in
the writings of Jefferson, Franklin, and Madison.107
Thomas Emerson has reasoned persuasively that a liberal interpretation of
the First Amendment encompasses academic freedom.108 Emerson maintains
that the First Amendment’s value is linked to its fostering of democratic values.
Specifically, Emerson recognizes four roles served by free expression: “(1) as
assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a
method of securing participation by the members of the society in social, in-
cluding political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the balance between
stability and change in the society.”109
These values, especially the first and second, help justify a researcher’s
privilege.  Emerson’s definition of individual self-fulfillment includes “the de-
velopment of ideas [and] mental exploration.”110  He recognizes that the free
flow of information and insight is necessary to the attainment of truth.  Like-
wise, Emerson argues that “suppression of information, discussion, or the clash
of opinion .  .  .  blocks the generation of new ideas .  .  .  .”111
Emerson explicitly described the role of First Amendment jurisprudence in
the promotion of academic freedom: “The heart of the system consists in the
right of the individual faculty member to teach, carry on research, and publish
without interference from the government, the community, the university ad-
ministration, or his fellow faculty members.”112
Similarly, Alexander Meiklejohn constructed a theory of the First Amend-
ment in accordance with notions of democratic self-government.113  According
                                                          
105. This article concentrates on the rights of the researcher.  For a discussion of the privacy rights
of the research subject, see Lawrence O. Gostun, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451,  esp. 494-513 (1995).
106. See Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitu-
tional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 356 (1978).
107. See id. at 358-60.
108. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963).
109. Id. at 878-79
110. Id. at 879.
111. Id. at 881.
112. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 594 (1970)); see O’Neil, supra note 48, at 853
(“Untrammeled research is at least as essential to the protection of academic freedom as untrammeled
teaching.”).
113. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245. But
see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4, 9, 20, 21
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to Meiklejohn, voters, as the individuals responsible for governing our society,
have a three-fold responsibility.  The voting public must try to understand is-
sues facing the nation, evaluate the decisions made by our governing represen-
tatives, and implement procedures for improving the decisionmaking process.114
The First Amendment,  Meiklejohn argues, should be interpreted in a manner
that will maximize the voters’ ability to perform these functions.
To this end, Meiklejohn spells out four rights of expression that must not be
restricted.  He includes the rights to education, literature and the arts, public
discussions, and “[t]he achievements of philosophy and the sciences in creating
knowledge and understanding of men and their world [that] must be available,
without abridgment, to every citizen.”115  Meiklejohn’s approach appears to
view anything short of an absolute researcher’s privilege as an “abridgment”
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
The concern for academic freedom is prevalent throughout the case law.  In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,116 the state brought contempt charges against Paul
Sweezy when he refused to cooperate with a state attorney general’s investiga-
tion.  The Attorney General had questioned him with regard to a lecture he
presented at a public university.  Sweezy was allegedly a member of the Pro-
gressive Party in violation of the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act.
The United States Supreme Court held that an individual’s right to lecture
and associate outweighed the state’s interest in maintaining order.117  In ren-
dering its decision, the Court recognized that “academic freedom and political
expression [are] areas in which government should be extremely reticent to
tread.”118  The court emphasized the importance of academic freedom:
No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries
cannot yet be made.  Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes.  Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, [and] to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.119
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,120 the appellants were employees of a pri-
vate university who refused to certify that they were not Communists.  The
court acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in protecting its educational
system from subversion, but once again tipped the scales in favor of the First
Amendment interest.121  The court stated, “Our Nation is deeply committed to
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and
                                                          
(1971).
114. See Meiklejohn, supra note 113, at 255.
115. Id. at 257.
116. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
117. See id. at 250.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
121. See id. at 603.
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not merely to the teachers concerned.”122
The court based its holding on a broad reading of the First Amendment
which needs “breathing space to survive.”123  Any encroachment on this
breathing space, the majority warned, could impose a “straight jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities [that] would imperil the fu-
ture of our Nation.”124
In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,125 the petitioner specifically claimed
an academician’s qualified privilege.  The EEOC requested tenure review files
in connection with a pending discrimination suit.  The action stemmed from a
professor’s allegations that she had been denied tenure in violation of Title VII.
The university refused to supply the files on two grounds.  First, it argued that a
qualified privilege against disclosure of confidential peer reviews protected it
from producing the files.  Second, it argued that the files were protected in ac-
cordance with First Amendment academic freedom.
The United States Supreme Court did not agree with either of these argu-
ments.  The Court did, however outline three separate grounds that a party
could advance when attempting to establish an acceptable researcher’s privi-
lege.  First, the court acknowledged that content-based restrictions on academic
freedom are not permissible.  The court specifically emphasized that “[n]othing
we say today should be understood as a retreat from this principle of respect
for legitimate academic decisionmaking.”126  Second, the court conceded that
confidentiality is important to the peer review process.127  The petitioner’s claim
was rejected only because the balance of interests gave heavy weight to deter-
rence of possible sexual discrimination.  Finally, the court tacitly supported the
recognition of other privileges on a case-by-case basis.  It cited Federal Rules of
Evidence 501 and Trammel v. United States128 as allowing leeway for privi-
leges.129  It acknowledged reluctance, however, to “exercise this authority ex-
pansively.”130  Specifically, the court said it was “especially reluctant to recog-
nize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the
relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.”131  In ar-
eas distinct from confidential peer review, the government has explicitly sanc-
tioned the value of confidential reporting in securing reliable data.132  The Na-
tional Census is a salient example.133  Another is the authorization of
                                                          
122. Id.
123. Id. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
124. Id. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
125. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
126. Id. at 199.
127. See id.
128. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
129. See 93 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
130. Id.; see also CAL. EVID. CODE  911.
131. Id. Compare Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
132. See Paul Nejelski & Lindsey M. Lerman, A Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege: What To
Do Before the Subpoena Arrives, 1971 WIS. L. REV. 1085, 1101.
133. See id.
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confidentiality certificates.134
Academic freedom also found recognition in the significant case on affirma-
tive action, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.135  The Court
stated, “Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitu-
tional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amend-
ment.”136  Thus, academic freedom finds its niche with blinking lights from the
Constitution.
2.  Privacy, Free Speech, and Free Association.  John Robertson identifies
two components of a scientist’s right to conduct research.  First, a scientist has a
right to select research topics.  Second, a researcher may select the means by
which he will carry out his research.137  The corollary is that the government has
“a negative duty not to interfere.”138
Robertson suggests that if a “right to research” were recognized as a consti-
tutionally protected right, the state could not restrict the right without
a compelling interest,139 for which it would bear the burden of proof.140  A clear
implication is that in a case involving confidential research, the government
would have the burden of proving that a breach of confidentiality was neces-
sary.
Robertson identifies three constitutional sources for a researcher’s right:
(1) liberty and privacy rights, (2) freedom of association, and (3) freedom of
speech.141  Liberty rights, Robertson points out, are embodied in the notion of
substantive due process.  He then traces the varying definitions of liberty142
from Meyer v. Nebraska143 (the fourteenth amendment “denotes … the right …
to acquire useful knowledge”) to Griswold v. Connecticut144 (recognizing a
“freedom of inquiry”).  Although the relationship between privacy rights and a
researcher’s confidential sources is beyond the scope of Robertson’s discussion,
the marital privacy sanctioned in the Griswold case and the privacy rights rela-
tive to child-bearing sanctioned in Roe v. Wade145 afford support for the privacy
of a research subject to be protected from governmental interference.  At the
very least, a still unresolved issue of such importance merits presentation to a
court.
                                                          
134. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 241(d), 242(a)(a), 290 dd-3, 290 ee-3 (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67,  2a.1-2a.8.
135. 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
136. Id. at 312; see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Black, J., and Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
137. See John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1978).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 1210.
140. See id. at 1211.
141. See id. at 1212-40.
142. See Robertson, supra note 137, at 1212-13.
143. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Robertson, supra note 137, at 1212.
144. 381U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Robertson, supra note 137, at 1213.
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
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Robertson suggests that freedom of association also sanctions a researcher’s
rights because researchers “associate” on two levels.  First, they associate with
their research subjects when conducting investigations.146  Second, they associ-
ate with other scientists when sharing their data.147  These associations lend
support for basing a researcher’s right on the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of association.
The strongest justification for a researcher’s right resides in the First
Amendment.  The Court has recognized that free speech includes both the
right to receive information148 and to gather news.149
3.  The Taking Issue.  In most cases, the reasonable expenses of complying
with a subpoena, including attorneys’ fees, can be provided for without undue
difficulty by negotiation or as a court-imposed condition to judicially compelled
production of data.  We must, however, also explain whether a researcher, who
is compelled to testify or produce data, is entitled to reasonable witness fees or
other compensation. Indeed, should a subpoenaing party be allowed to obtain a
free ride (or an expense-only ride) on a researcher’s investment of time and
money in research instead of paying a substantial premium?  Most researchers
are not in the market of furnishing information or testimony in litigation;
moreover, time spent in responding to a subpoena may be time taken from
other opportunities.  Is such compelled activity a taking without just
compensation of the researcher’s livelihood—an invasion of the researcher’s
business property interests? The Advisory Committee on the recent
amendment to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
“[a]rguably the compulsion to testify can be regarded as a ‘taking’ of
intellectual property.”150
As a general rule, property interests do not materialize merely because an
individual has “an abstract need or desire for,” or “unilateral expectation of,”
a ”benefit.”151  To determine whether a protectible interest in intangible prop-
erty exists, a court must first look to state law.152  Once a court is armed with the
applicable state law, it may then consider whether such an interest is protected
by the Fifth Amendment.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,153 the Supreme Court confronted four is-
sues: whether trade secrets were a property interest?  If so, whether the data-
consideration and data-disclosure provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
                                                          
146. See Robertson, supra note 137, at 1214-15.
147. See id.
148. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Robertson, supra note 137, at 1219-26.
149. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972); Robertson, supra note 137, at 1226-40.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note (citing United States v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 666 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982)); see  9A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 60, § 2463 at 76-78.
151. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
152. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992); Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984).
153. 467 U.S. 986.
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cide and Rodenticide Act involve a taking of such a property interest.154  If
there was a taking, was it a taking public use?  If so, does the statute adequately
provide for just compensation?  The Court first determined that a property in-
terest in trade secrets existed under state law and that Monsanto’s nondisclo-
sure of its data to others confirmed its interest in maintaining this information
as a trade secret.  Thereafter, the Court held that trade secrets were protectible
under the Fifth Amendment.  The protection of the Fifth Amendment turned
on whether Monsanto had a reasonable investment-backed expectation of pri-
vacy for its property interest under the Act.  Monsanto met this test for data
submitted during certain periods but not others.155  The court also held that any
taking was one for public use156 and that an adequate statutory remedy existed
for providing compensation.157
Similarly, in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,158 the Court
held that in the determination of whether a regulation is a taking of property,
three factors are particularly relevant.  First, the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant; second, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations; and, third, the character of the
governmental action.159  In effect, the Court weighed the nature and extent of
the economic loss to the individual (or class of) property owner(s) against the
nature and extent of the governmental interest.
A researcher who asserts a constitutional “taking” claim for substantial wit-
ness fees and loss of profit from a compelled disclosure of confidential sources
must overcome obstacles.  Although Monsanto recognizes a property interest in
a trade secret, it also requires a researcher to show that he had a reasonable,
investment-backed expectation.  A court might recognize such an expectation
as reasonable if a researcher’s prospects of future research depends upon the
researcher’s assurances of confidentiality to others.  Any compelled breach of
such confidentiality might impair the researcher’s future livelihood by discour-
aging potential sources of valuable information from disclosing their informa-
tion to a researcher that they deem untrustworthy.
The balancing in Connolly raises yet another hurdle.  The researcher must
demonstrate that the adverse impact of compelled disclosure outweighs the na-
                                                          
154. See Note, Trade Secrets in Discovery: From First Amendment Disclosure to Fifth Amendment
Protection, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1330 (1991); Gregory Gelfand, “Taking” Informational Property
Through Discovery, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 703 (1988); Marcus, supra note 47, at 415-18.
155. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005-14. In addition to determining whether “property” was
“taken,” the “court must determine whether the taking served a private purpose, in which case the
Constitution forbids taking entirely, or whether the taking served a public purpose, in which case the
owner must be compensated… . [I]f the taking was for a public purpose, the court must determine
whether the owner received ‘just compensation.’”  Note, supra note 154, at 1337.
156. See id. at 1016.
157. See id. at 1019.
158. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
159. See id. at 225 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
In land use cases, a plurality opinion of the Supreme Court articulates a “total taking” test. Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, at 1030 (1992).  It is an open question whether and to
what extent this test will apply to claims that intellectual property has been taken.
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ture and importance of the government’s need for the information.  The
amount of investment in the researcher’s project would have to outweigh the
government’s legitimate interest in presenting all of the relevant evidence in a
judicial proceeding. The monetary and temporal costs associated with garner-
ing the necessary information to outweigh the government’s interest might be
so high as to deter such an undertaking, especially considering the risk of an
unsatisfactory outcome.160
A researcher who has not yet published the findings of his research is in an
especially good position to counter the demand for disclosure of confidential
sources by claiming a property interest in his work.  Conceivably a court might
favorably view the case of a researcher who has a reasonable expectation of
eventual profit from work in process that has not yet been published, particu-
larly in a competitive field.  A court might well look askance at a premature
subpoena for still confidential information that could be lucrative to competi-
tion and thus inimical to a researcher’s property interest in his own work.161  In
the contrasting circumstances of American Tobacco,162 the Second Circuit re-
jected the claim of a scholar’s privilege under New York law when the demand
for disclosure related to confidential data underlying a published report.  Given
that the results of the report had already been published, the court held there
was no chilling effect upon scientific research.
4.  State Shield Laws And Privacy Rights.  Researchers may find
reinforcement for confidentiality in state constitutions or statutes that create
“reporter’s shields”163 and privacy rights.164  As of 1989, twenty-six states had
enacted various shield laws that protect a journalist’s disclosure of
information.165  For example, California Evidence Code section 1070,
encompasses a shield law166 that protects a newsperson who refuses to divulge a
legitimate source from contempt charges.  Significantly, the Code’s protection
extends against demands for disclosure issued by the legislature or
administrative agencies as well as the courts.  It should be noted, however, that
there remain unresolved questions of equal protection, when a researcher
invokes a reporter’s shield, particularly if a statute speaks in terms of
institutional media.
In addition, privacy rights under state constitutions or statutes may also jus-
                                                          
160. See Mount Sinai Sch. of Med. v. American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1529 (2d Cir. 1989).
161. See id. at 1527-29.
162. Id. at 1528.
163. See , e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070. See generally, Annot., Privilege of
Newsgatherer Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources of Information, 99 ALR3d 37 (1980 & Supp.
1996).
164. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also Kahn v. Santa Clara Cty. Superior Court, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 662 (Cal. App. 1987); Board of Trustees v. Santa Clara Cty. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160
(Cal. App. 1981).
165. See Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source Recovery for
Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553, 1566 (1989).
166. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; see also MICH. COMP. L. § 767.5a (1991); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021-
.025 (1992).
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tify a researcher’s privilege.  Many states either explicitly or implicitly recog-
nize an individual’s privacy interest.167  The researcher can invoke a right of pri-
vacy to protect confidential sources of research against attempted breaches of
confidentiality.
a.  What constitutes the “press”?  In most First Amendment cases, the
courts have little trouble defining whether the parties involved are members of
the press.  Hence there is little comment in the case law on just what is the full
connotation of the First Amendment phrase “or of the press.”  In Lovell v.
Griffin,168 the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he press in its [historic]
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion.”169 Chief Justice Burger has added that “[t]he Speech
Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express
ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses specifically on the liberty to
disseminate expression broadly .  .  .  .”170  Under his rationale, freedom of the
press is essentially “the freedom to communicate with a large, unseen
audience.”171 This view equates the occasional pamphleteer, as well as the
publisher who publishes on a relatively large scale, with the publisher of a large
daily newspaper.  This expansive perspective characterizes other statements of
the Supreme Court.172  At least two other views of what constitutes the press
have emerged, divergently elucidating the sparse text of the Press Clause.173
One of these views would include within the definition of press, “free-lance
writers, radio and television stations, magazines, academicians, and any other
person possessing materials in connection with the dissemination to the public
of a newspaper, book, broadcast or other form of communication.”174  President
Carter incorporated these words in proposing legislation to prohibit the search
or seizure of “work product—such as notes, interview files and film[s]” in po-
lice searches of the documentary materials of the “press.”175
The second view, a much narrower approach, would accord Press Clause
protection only to the “institutional press,” in the same tenor of most state
                                                          
167. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
168. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
169. Id. at 452.
170. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799-800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
171. Id. at 801 n.5.
172. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-05 (1972); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143-44 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987); Smith v. A Pocono Country Place Property Owners Ass’n, 686 F. Supp.
1053, 1055-56 (M.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D.D.C. 1979), aff’d,
668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
173. See Floyd Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous
Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580-83 (1979); Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 600-01 (1979); James L. Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions:
An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655, 683-87 (1979).
174. Abrams, supra note 173, at 581-82.
175. Id. at 582 n.112 (quoting 125 CONG. REC. H 1866, 1867-88, S. 3771, 3772).
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shield law statutes.176  This view focuses upon the regularity of publication, the
breadth of dissemination, and the regularity of employment by the individual
journalist who invokes the protection.  Only those who are truly in the
“publishing business,” rather than some other business, which happens to dis-
seminate information on certain occasions, would be granted protection.177
Some court opinions augur well for envisaging the press as extending be-
yond institutional confines.  Justice Brennan has stated that there is no clear
line consistent with the First Amendment between “a publication which dis-
seminates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized in-
formation to a selective, finite audience.”178  In his opinion,
[t]hat [a publication’s] information is “specialized” or that its subscribers pay
“substantial fees” hardly distinguishes these reports from articles in many publications
that would surely fall on the “media” side of the line .  .  .  .  Few published statements
are of universal interest, and few publications are distributed without charge.  Much
fare of any metropolitan daily is specialized information for which a selective, finite
audience pays a fee.  Nor is there any reason to treat [a publication] differently be-
cause it has “a limited number of subscribers.”179
In Shoen v. Shoen,180 Mark and Edward Shoen served a subpoena on Ronald
Watkins, a nonparty investigative author, in connection with a defamation ac-
tion that they brought against their father Leonard Shoen, the founder of U-
Haul.  The plaintiffs claimed that Leonard Shoen had made public statements
connecting them to the murder of Eva Berg Shoen, the wife of Leonard’s eldest
son Sam.  They sought to compel Watkins to disclose the details of several in-
terviews that he had with Leonard in connection with Watkins’ book Birthright,
which describes the struggle within the Shoen family for control of the U-Haul
company.  Watkins claimed that this information was protected under a re-
porter’s privilege.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that a book author is not
a member of the institutional press or media and hence that a reporter’s privi-
lege would not apply.181  The court found that Watkins had standing to invoke a
reporter’s privilege:
What makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content.  .  .  .  The test .  .  .
is whether the person seeking to invoke the privilege had “the intent to use mate-
rial—sought, gathered or received—to disseminate information to the public and
[whether] such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process.”  If both
conditions are satisfied, then the privilege may be invoked.182
                                                          
176. See id. at 582.
177. See id. at 564-65; see also Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amend-
ment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992) (noting that it is “both appropriate and desirable that the press
enjoy a special constitutional right of access in newsgathering”).
178. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 782 n. 6 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also John W. Wade, The Tort Liability of Investigative Reporters, 37 VAND. L. REV.
301, 344-45 (1984); Michael Traynor, Defamation Law: Shock Absorbers for Its Ride Into the Groves of
Academe, 16 J. C. & U. L. 373, 387 n.49, 389 n.54 (1990).
179. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 782.
180. 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
181. See id. at 1293.
182. Id. at 1293-94 (citation omitted) (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.),
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Stephens v. American Home Assurance Co.183 adopted a similarly broad view
of who may invoke the reporter’s privilege.  In that case, non-party A.M. Best
company sought a protective order to quash a subpoena served upon it by
American Home Assurance Company, a defendant in a related case.  A.M.
Best publishes annual reports on the financial status of various corporations.
The court found that the information sought was protected under a reporter’s
privilege: “The reporter’s privilege is not limited to organized press.  .  .  .  ‘The
informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press .  .  .  is
also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers,
and dramatists.’”184  Thus, more researchers may find the reporter’s privilege
expanding to encompass their activities as courts begin to recognize that the
policy reasons for having a privilege in a journalistic context also apply to re-
search.185
b.  Denial of equal protection by the shield laws.  If the “press” includes
articles and reports published by a researcher, then judicial pronouncements on
the First Amendment freedoms of the press would apply to such works.186
Many states provide shield laws that protect a newsperson from having to
reveal confidential sources in certain situations yet they do not protect other
persons who disseminate information (that is, researchers).  Given the potential
expansion of the term “press” to include researchers, might such a state statute
be a denial of “the equal protection of the laws” under the Fourteenth
Amendment?187
It is well-established that whenever a state infringes upon a fundamental
right, such as freedom of the press, the law must be analyzed under strict scru-
tiny to ensure compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.188  If a regulation classifies on the basis of the content of the publication
or speech, it will violate the Equal Protection Clause.  In Carey v. Brown,189 the
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which prohibited the picketing of
residences or dwellings while permitting the peaceful picketing of a residence
                                                          
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987)).
183. No. 91 Civ. 2898 (JSM) (KAR), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5086 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Apicella
v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (technical publications); State v. Fontanille, No. 93-
KH-935, 1994 WL 25830 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (investigative book author).
184. Stephens, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *23 (citation omitted) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 705 (1972)).
185. See Kraig L. Baker, Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy Journalists?   Determining Who Has
Standing to Claim the Journalist’s Privilege, 69 WASH. L. REV. 739 (1994).
186. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
187. Cf. Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (state sales tax exemption
for newspapers and religious, professional, trade or sports journals unconstitutionally discriminated
against general interest monthly magazine on the basis of content). But cf. Field Research Corp. v. S.F.
Superior Court, 453 P.2d 747, 749-51 (1969) (in defamation action, a defendant who is not a newspaper
publisher or broadcaster is not eligible for the state’s retraction statute).  See also Dyk, supra note 177,
at 939.
188. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
189. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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which was also a place of employment involved in a labor dispute.  The statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated among picketers
on the basis of the content of their speech.190
In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc.  v. Ragland,191 the court invalidated a state
tax scheme that exempted newspapers and some, but not all, journals or maga-
zines from the tax.  Eligibility for tax exempt status of a publisher could not be
predicated on the content of its publication.192
To deny the privilege of nondisclosure of confidential sources to a re-
searcher while affording it to a newsperson is to draw a classification based
upon the content of the speech.  Arguably, such a state statute would deny re-
searchers equal protection under the law and thus be unconstitutional.  Can a
researcher, who is not necessarily publishing information about current events,
but instead is disseminating information in a topical fashion, claim that a denial
of the privilege to him is a denial of equal protection?  Carey and Ragland vin-
dicate a researcher’s right to protection on the ground that a researcher’s publi-
cation is within the purview of the “press.”
C.  Request a Court Order that May Help Protect You from Liability for
Disclosure and/or Require the Party Who Issued the Subpoena to
Indemnify You
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,193 the
First Amendment does not preclude a state court from enforcing liability in
contract or promissory estoppel for breach of a promise of confidentiality.  Ac-
cordingly, a researcher should consider obtaining a court order that would pro-
vide the basis for a defense of discharge by supervening impracticability194 and,
if possible, require the party who issued the subpoena to furnish an indemnity
against such a claim and the costs of defending it.195  Indeed, the potential expo-
sure of the researcher who promised confidentiality may in itself afford a court
additional reason for declining to order disclosure of confidential data.
D.  If the Trial Court Orders Disclosure of Confidential Data, Consider
Requesting a Stay As Well As Review by an Appellate Court
If a researcher has a persuasive rationale for confidentiality and the data is
safeguarded, it should be clear that the researcher has important interests to as-
                                                          
190. See  id. at 461-62.
191. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
192. See id. at 229-31. The court noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court, in upholding the statute,
had stated that even if the statute was unconstitutionally discriminatory, “the exemption would fall,
not the tax.”  Id. at 226. The state court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded “for pur-
poses not inconsistent with this opinion.”  Id. at 234; see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
193. 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the
Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 118 (1992) (suggesting duty of confidentiality, enforceable in
tort action).
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 264 (1981).
195. Under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 45(c)(3)(B), “the court may order appearance or production only
upon specified conditions.”  The furnishing of an indemnity would be a reasonable condition.
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sert, even if these interests do not persuade the trial court.  They may afford
reasons for a stay pending appellate review.196  A researcher should not turn
over confidential data in response to a trial court order, without first consider-
ing a stay and a writ or appeal.
However, a researcher should be aware that in most cases, discovery orders
are not immediately appealable, even when they are directed to a non-party.197
Thus, in many cases, the only route to an immediate review of a discovery or-
der is to violate the order and incur contempt sanctions.198  As a nonparty, a re-
searcher may immediately appeal an order imposing contempt sanctions,
whether criminal or civil.199
E.  The Ultimate Question: Consider Refusing to Obey a Final and Binding
Court Order of Disclosure and Going to Jail For Contempt
The story is not over even when an order to disclose confidential data sur-
vives whatever appellate review is available, if any, and is final and binding.
The researcher still has a choice whether to obey.  The sanction for disobedi-
ence is contempt, usually accompanied by coercive imprisonment or fines or
both.200  The decision is a highly personal one.  Newspaper reporters have gone
to jail to protect their sources.201  It bears recalling that the leading case estab-
lishing the work product doctrine arose when a courageous lawyer risked im-
prisonment for contempt.202  A researcher who has a principled basis for non-
disclosure could decide to carry on such a worthy tradition by refusing to obey
an order for compelled disclosure.203  At some juncture the court may itself re-
lease the researcher from custody if it realizes that coercion is ineffective
against one who makes a principled commitment to honor a promise of confi-
dentiality.204
                                                          
196. See FED. R. APP. PROC. 8. On the question of appealability and review of orders with regard
to a subpoena, see 9A WRIGHT &. MILLER, supra note 60, § 2466.
197. See Bennett v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1995); MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train House,
Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 666 F.2d
364, 367 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982).
198. See id.  Bert Black has recently suggested that “a scientist who is not participating in litigation
as an expert retained by a litigant should be given standing to appeal a subpoena directly. This would
eliminate the harshness of having to be cited for contempt before appealing a subpoena.”  Black, supra
note 12,  at 725-27.
199. See Estate of Bishop v. Bechtel Power Corp., 905 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).
200. See , e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1826; FED. R. CIV. PROC. 45(e), 70; CAL. CIV. PRO. § 1219.
201. See , e.g., In Re Farr, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. App. 1974); see also Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d
464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
202. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
203. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (James Richard Scarce), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994); Rik Scarce, Protection of Confidentiality Worth Jail Time, THE
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, June 13, 1993, at A19; see also In Re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); O’Neil, supra note 48, at 843-44, 849.
204. See In Re Farr, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 653 (when “disobedience of the order is based upon an estab-
lished articulated moral principle … it is necessary to determine the point at which the commitment
ceases to serve its coercive purpose and becomes punitive in character”); Catena v. Seidl, 343 A.2d 744
(N.J. 1975) (“no substantial likelihood that further confinement will accomplish the purpose of the or-
der”); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983); In Re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
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CONCLUSION
From the inception of a study to the decision whether to refuse to obey a
court order to disclose confidential data, a researcher has many opportunities
to safeguard research and take a stance in court to protect the privacy of study
participants, in the interest of well-grounded scientific or social analysis.  Re-
searchers have a responsibility to proceed with caution in giving confidentiality
assurances and protecting data.  Courts have a responsibility to balance the in-
terests of the litigants who seek disclosure of confidential information against
the interest of researchers and the public in useful studies that depend on hon-
oring assurances of confidentiality.  With common sense and good will in every
quarter, there should be few spectacles of a scholar going to jail to honor his
promise of confidentiality in the interest of useful research.
                                                          
1978); see also United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977)
(coercive imprisonment ended but punishment via imprisonment for criminal contempt followed).
In federal courts and most state courts, under the “collateral bar rule,” the validity of the court or-
der cannot be collaterally attacked in a criminal contempt or habeas corpus proceeding.  See, e.g.,
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).  California is an exception.  See In Re Berry, 436
P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968).
